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BEYOND JUSTICIABILITY: CHALLENGES OF
IMPLEMENTING/ENFORCING SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Shadrack B. 0. Guttc
I. INTRODUcION
On April 27, 1998, the new political dispensation in South Africa
celebrated its fourth official birthday. In the relatively short period since its
inception, the new order has gained a justifiable reputation, as an emergent
constitutional democracy that is committed to and based on the rule of law and
human rights. The old South African legal system was justifiably characterized,
as a transplanted Euro-centric and was North American in orientation,' in
addition to its indisputable racist institutional and legislative trademarks.2 The
present legal system is paradoxically gaining a measure of legitimacy without
necessarily addressing the "missing African link;" a matter which received judicial
recognition or notice in the first case to be filed in the Constitutional Court?
Indeed, part of the explanation for this process of legitimation of the South
African legal order and legal system lies in the larger political changes that
replaced the apartheid regime and its value systems and institutional expressions,
* Law School and Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Wits University. The Essay was
originally presented as a "guest lecture" on February S, 1998 at the Faculty of Law as part
of the Selection Process for a Professorial Chair in Law and Directorship of the Centre
for Applied Legal Studies, Wits University. The author wishes to thank ProfessorJohn
Dugard for his strong recommendation that the essay be published.
' See Hugh Corder and Dennis Davis, Law and Soa Prace:An Introducton, in
ESSAs ON LAWAND SOCIAL PPACTICE 1, 4 (Hugh Corder ed., 1988).
2 Seeg ra,,JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTSANDTHESOUTHAFRJcAN LEGAL ORDER
(1978); see also CALS Documentation Centre, AparftekLegsation Chronology, 1997
(a consultarcy Research Reportto the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, on file with
author).
' See S v Makwnyane 1995 (3) SA 391 , 252-60 (CC) 0adala, J., concurring);
300-303 (Mokgoro,J., concurring); 91362-64 (Sachs, J., concurring); See Mthembu v.
Letsela, 1997 (2) SA 936 (CC), Bangindawo v. Head of the Nyanda Regional Authority,
1998 (3) BCLR 314 ("K) (showing the influence of the new constitutional Order to
partially enable the courts to look more favorably into indigenous African law and
institutions).
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including transforming the judiciary and the judicial values and cultures
The creation of a Constitutional Court with clearly defined constitutional
values that include human dignity, the achievement of equality, commitment to
the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism,
has not been insignificant' Equally significant has been clear expression of
commitment to political pluralism, multi-partyism and constitutional supremacy
as a replacement for the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.6 The
Constitutional commitment to national reconciliation and the establishment of
transparent, albeit controversial, institutions, such as the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, to address national reconciliation in the context of seeking partial
redress to gross violation of human rights in the past, has also contributed to this
process of legitimation.7
From an international law and human rights perspective, the subject
areas forming the focus of the present essay, the expressed constitutional
imperatives that in particular require the interpretation of the entire Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, as well as other legislation by paying attention to
international law and appropriate comparative foreign law, is most significant.'
So is the recognition of customary international law, which does not conflict with
the Constitution or an act of Parliament, as constituting law in the Republic,
similar to international agreements that are adopted by the legislature.9 The
4 One academic commentator characterized the change in the legal system as
spearheaded by the Constitutional Court to be reflective of a transformation from a
"formal vision of law" to a "substantive vision". See Alfred Cockrell, Ra nbow
Jurisprudence, 12 S. AFR.J. HUm. RTs. 1, 3 (1996).
s SeeS.AFRCONST. §§ 1, 7-39. &e S.AFR. CoNsT. §§ 7-35 (Interim Const. 1993).
6 SeeS.AFR.CoNST.§§ I(C-D),2, 19.
7 See S. As. CoNST. postamble (Interim Const. 1993); Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995; S. AFR. CoNST. sched. 6, 22.
8 SeeS.AFR. CONST. §§ 231-32. For comments by some academics on the application
of international lawin South Africa under the interim and the final Constitution, seeJohn
Dugard, Intemational Law and the "Wnalf" Cosbon, I I S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 241
(1995); John Dugard, The Role ofintemational Lawin Interpreting the &/l of ights, 10
S. AfR.J. HUM. RTs. 208 (1994);John Dugard, InternatonalLawand the South African
Contmbo, I EuR.J. INT'L L77 (1997); Raylene Keightly; Public IntermatonalLawand
the Final Constiuon, 12 S. APJ. HUM. RTs. 405 (1996).
9 See S. AFR. CONST. § 39 (I)b-c). These sections enjoin the appropriate organs,
including the courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights that they "must consider
international lawand may consider freign law." Id. The corresponding provisions in the
Draft Constitution state "when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any
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establishment ofthe Constitutional Court, and enjoining all courts to assume the
powerand dutyto enfbrce the Constitution, includingthe Bill of Rights, is historic
in the life of the nation.'"
The power and duty ofthe courts to mediate constitutional and human
rights disputes and to resolve such disputes by making authoritative and binding
decisions, brings to the forefront the principle of justiciability." When applied to
a situation where the Bill of Rights requires justiciability for a whole range of
human rights and freedoms: civil, political, economic, social and cultural, this
enhanced role for the Courts require critical examination to determine its
potential, scope and limits, given the structure of the South Africa society.'2 In
other words, to what extent can the courts and other legal role players be able
to contribute to the achievement of social reconstruction and social justice? If
law, especially litigation, was used with some degree of effect for resistance
purposes against the apartheid social and political order, 3 how can this be turned
around and used for reconstructive social redistributive justice? Assuming that it
is used for this purpose, what are the limits of the justiciability strategy?
In part II, I wll examine how the Constitution expresses the role of the
courts in responding to constitutional interpretation in general and the
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law". Id § 233.
0 .ee §§ 167-69. The lower courts, the Magistrates' courts, are only disempowered
from ruling "on the constitutionality of any legislation or any conduct of the President."
See id.§ 170.
" A prominent Nigerian constitutional scholar defines justiciability as a combination of
judicial power and duty bestowed constitutionally on the courts to adjudicate violations
ofthe law, justiciability ofthe Constitutio is not an inherent power enjoyed by all courts -
it is consft nally bestowed. BENJAMIN OBi NWABUEZE,JUDK:USM IN COMMONWEALTH
AFucx THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN GOVERNMENT 21 (1977). In the South African
context, Loots has suggested that justiciability implies determining whether a particular
issue is appropriately resolvable by the courts and that this involves procedural and
substantive considerations. See Access to Courts and~usdabi/ity, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA I (Matthew Chaskalson et al. eds., 1996).
2 South Africa's dominant economic system is capitalist. Like all other capitalist social
formations, social differentiation based on class and gender is clearly manifest. However,
two features that are not inherently capitalistic are the heightened social inequalities
where the poor and disadvantaged form a significant majority and its composition along
racial lines.
'3 See general/y R. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS : LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
APARTHEID, 1980-1994 (1995).
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enforcement of rights and freedoms in particular. Part III will be a brief
explanation ofthe historic and persisting division between civil and political rights
on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, and the
attempts bythe world community and the community of South Africa to re-unite
the two sides and treatthem equally. Part IV examines what I characterize as the
hidden and open expression of socio-economic rights in cases that go to courts
for judicial determination with a view to demonstrating the overiapping nature
of civil and political rights, as well as freedoms and social, economic and cultural
rights. PartV analyzes socio-economic rights cases, and demonstrates how the
courts have expressed what they recognize to be the limits to judicial remedies
in certain circumstances. Finally, part V will sketch out some preliminary
conclusions on the need for legal human rights institutions, like the Centre for
Applied Legal Studies, to understand the significance and limits of justiciability in
public interest law in areas ofsocio-economic rights, to strive to stretch the limits
and to balance justiciability with other legal roles and implementation or
enforcement mechanisms anticipated by the socio-economic rights provisions.
II. THE CONSTITULTONAL EXPRESSION ON THE INSTrruTION OF COURTS AND
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONsTruTION,
INCLUDING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
In addressing the issue of how the Constitution expresses the courts
role in interpreting the Constitution induding the Bill of Rights when adjudicating
disputes before them, it may surprise those who are not familiar with the details
of the Constitution to start by pointing out, as I do here, that the Constitution
uses the word or concept "court" in three different ways: "general," "broad" and
unarrow* meanings of the term "court."
The word or concept or term "court" is used in the "Application"
provision in the Bill of Rights without qualification.'4 It appears that the use of the
,4 See S. Am CoNsr. § 8; Application:
(I) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legslature, the
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
(3) In applying the provisions ofthe Bill of Rights to natural or juristic
persons... a court -
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill,
must apply, or when necessary, develop the
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term "court" in the "Enforcement of Rights" provision is also without
qualification.'" The same applies to the use of the term under the provisions
relating to the "Application of International law" and the part of "Judicial
System."' 6 The term "court" is used generally in these circumstances.
However, the word/concept "court" is used much more broadly under
the section dealing with "Access to Courts." "Access to Courts" in this section
means access to "court" or, where appropriate, "another independent and
impartial tribunal or forum."' 7 This broader meaning of the term "court" is
common law to the extent that legislation does
not give effect to that right; and
0b) may develop rules ofthe common lawto limit
the right, provided that the limitation is in
accordance with section 36(l).
'5 SeeS.Am. CoNsT. § 38; Enforcement of Rights:
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or
threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a
declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are:
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person
who cannot act in their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the
interest of, group or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its
members.
16 See S.AF. CONST. § 233; Application of International law.
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with
intern law over any altenatie interpretation that is inconsistent
with international law.
SeeS.AFR. CONST. § 166;Judicial System:
The courts are...
(e) any other court established or recognized in
terms of an Act of Parliament, which may include
any court of a status similar to either the High
Courts or the Magistrates Courts.
,7 See S. AFR. CoNST. § 34; Access to Courts:
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by
the application of law decided in afaUr public hearing before a court
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repeated under the provision in the Bill of Rights dealing with *Interpretation of
the Bill of Rights."'
In addition to the above two meanings of the concept "court," one
general and unqualified, and the other broad and inclusive of other tribunals, and
forums where disputes are resolved (alterative dispute resolution mechanisms
included), there is yet a third use of the word "court" in the Constitution. The
third use is what appears in the sections dealing with the vesting of "Judicial
Authority" and part of Judicial System." 9 It appears to me that this narrow and
or, were appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or
forum.
,e SeeS.AFR. CoNST. § 39; Interpretation of Bill of Rights:
(I) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum...
(a) must promote the values that underlie an
open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.
SSe S.-AFm CONST. § 165;Judicial Authority:
(I) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution
and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favor
or prejudice.
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of
the courts.
(4) Organs of state, through legislatie and other measures, must
assistand protecthe courtsto ensurethe independence, impartiality,
dignity, accessibility and effectieness of the courts.
(5),An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom
and organs of state to which it applies.
See S. AR CONST. §166; Judicial System:
The courts are:
(a) the Constitutional Court;
(b) the Supreme Court of Appeal;
(c ) the High Courts, including any high court of
appeal that may be established by an Act of
Parliament to hear appeals from High Courts;
(d) the Magistrates Courts.
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specific meaning is what is meant by 'courts' underthe provisions relating to the
criminal justice processes,2" as well as the power and duty of "courts" to decide
the validity of declaration or extension of states of emergency.2
See S. AFP. CONST. § 35; Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons:
(I) Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has
the right...
(d) to be brought before a court as soon as
reasonably possible, but not later than...
(1) 48 hours after the arrest;
or
(1i) the end of the first court
day after the expiry of the 48
hours, if the 48 hours expire
outside ordinary court hours
or on a day which is not an
ordinary court day;
(e) at the first court appearance after being
arrested, to be charged orto be informed ofthe
reason for the detention to continue, or to be
released;
(2) Everyone who is detained, induding every sentenced prisoner,
has the right...
(c)to challenge the lawfUlness of the detention in
person before a court and, if the detention is
unlawful, to be released.
(3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the
right...
(c ) to a public trial before an ordinary court;
(o) of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.
21 SeeS.AR. CONST. § 37; States of Emergency:
(I)Astate of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of
Parliament, and only when...
(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of....
(a) a declaration of a state of emergency;
(b) any extension of a declaration of a state of
emergency; or
86 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 4
In identifsiing the above three different ways in which the Constitution
uses the word/concept/term "court," it becomes important to indicate that the
"justicability" concept which is the focus of this essay is often or usually limited to
the third narrow and specific use of the term "courts" as the agency of
justiciability. However, in confronting issues of rights and their implementation
or enforcement, it is critical that the term "courts" be understood in its broader
or more general sense as envisaged in the Constitution. Justiciability, if confined
to the role of the courts narrowly conceived, would greatly limitthe realization
of human rights, or undermine the construction of a culture of human rights in
South Africa.
The Bill of Rghts chapter, an integral part of the Constitution, requires
that it be interpreted more specially than the rest of the Constitution?' This
special status of the human rights provisions in the Constitution needs to be
recognized and appreciated, since a significant part of the rights and freedoms
recognized in the Constitution are drawn from international instruments and
norms, some ofthem binding and some not binding on South Africa. This is not
necessarily the case with the rest of the provisions of the Constitution.
Ill. THE DMSION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND ATEMPTS TO RE-UNrE THEM
A The Histoic DMkion ofRghts at the United Na dons and the Re-Untca don
Movement
Although the expression of specific rights or freedoms in the Universal
Declaration of Human RightsP differs and may allow for different implementation
or enforcement strategies and means, the Declaration did not categorize and
divide rights and freedoms into the two main groupings that later came to
characterize human rights and freedoms. These groupings are civil and political
on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural on the other. The bipolar
(c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken,
in consequence of a declaration of a state of
emergency.
2 See S.AmR Cow'-r. §§ 8(3), 39(1-2); Bill of Rights; see also S. AFm CoNST. §§ 2, 233.
' See Universal Dedaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A Q11), at 7 1, U.N. Doc.
810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. The rights recognized in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights range from prohibition against torture (art. 5) to the right to work (art.
24).
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ideological divisions within the United Nations that intensified after 1948, the
year of adoption ofthe Universal Declaration, culminated in the adoption of two
instruments on human rights and freedoms,24 civil and political,' and economic,
social and cultural,26 with different implementation/ enforcement mechanisms
and institutional arrangements atthe UN level. The civil and political rights and
freedoms came to be associated with "justidability," while economic, social and
cultural rights became associated with "non-justiciability," and with gradualist and
less defined means and strategies of implementation/ enforcement.27
In 1993, at the Vienna World Human Rights Conference, the
international community, represented officially by government representatives
but under the shadow of the global civil society movement, grappled with the
problems associated with the differential, and unequal approaches to the
promotion and protection of rights on the basis of their being grouped as either
belonging to the "justiciable" civil and political group or the so-called 'non-
justiciable" economic, social and cultural group. Vienna adopted a bold position
that theoretically attempts to re-unite the rights and freedoms and to put them
on equal footing.
All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and
interrelated. The international community must treat human
rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing
and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and
4 See Asbjom Eide &Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Nghts: A UniersaI
Challenge, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PJGHTs: A TEXTBOOK 15-40 (Asbjom
Elde et al. eds., 1995).
' See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR. The covenant was
accompanied by an optional protocol allowng for petition or complaints by individuals
against states alleging violation of rights and freedoms enshrined in the main covenant.
See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA
Res. 2200AXXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at59, U.N. Doc. N6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (enteredinto force Mar. 23, 1976).
See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/63 16 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S., 3 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
2 See PAUL HUNT, RECLAIMING SocIAL RiGHTs: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTrVES 7-9, 24-31, 53-63 (1996); see Elde & Rosas, supra note 24, at 15-17.
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religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
systems, to promote all human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 8
Atthe institutional and process levels, the UN Commission on Human
Rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, international
human rights experts and independent international legal and human rights
organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists, have been
developing an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,29 Principles3" and Guidelines.3
These changes should fadlitate more effective implementation and enforcement
of socio-economic rights through justiciability, and better programmed reporting
criteria backed by sanctions.
B. The Inteim Consituion and.Soclo-Economic Rghts
In the intellectual debates leading to the adoption of the South African
Interim Constitution, the debates, reminiscent of the old debates that had
informed the UN processes leading to the division of rights and freedoms into
the two camps was re-enacted.32 The result was a chapter on "Fundamental
Rights," not "Bill of Rights," that leaned very heavily on the civil and political rights
side of the rights recognized and entrenched.33
' SeeVienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 14-25,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (Part 1) (1993).
2' See Economic, Soca and Culturl Nghts: A Compilation of Essential Documents,
1997 I.Cj. 55.
30 See id. at 63.
1, Seeid.at79.
' See Nicholas Haysom, OntufonaL~m, Maoritaransm, Democracy and Socio-
economkRhty, 8 S.AFR.J. HUm. RTS. 451,452 (1992); see Etienne Mureinik, Beyond
a aarter ofLuxuries: Economicfghts in the Constftufon, 8 S.AFR.J. HUm. RTs. 464
(1992); see general/yD. M. Davis, The Case Agaist the Inclusion of Soc'o-Economic
Demands in the &// of Rights Except as Directive PindA'es, 8 S. AFR. J. HUm. RTs. 475
(1992).
See S.AFP. CoNST. (interim Const. 1993) (n the economic, social and cultural rights
broadly defined, the interim Constitution provided for affirmative action and restitution
of land (§§ 8(3), 121-123), economic activity (§ 26), labor relations (§ 27), property (§
28), environment (§ 29), basic nubition, health and social services for children (§ 30) and
culture and education (§§ 31-32). The rest of the "Fundamental Rights" chapter covered
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C The Final Consb~itun andSodo-Economic gh&
The final Constitution effected the recognition of and an arrangement
for rights and freedoms in three significant ways. Except for the "economic
activity" freedom as expressed in the interim Constitution which was
reformulated and either intentionally or unintentionally down-scaled to freedom
of choice of trade, occupation and profession,34 all the rights and freedoms
identif&d in this essay as failing within the scope of socio-economic rights broadly
defined were either retained, as they were in essence, or substantially expanded
in scope in the final Constitution. 5 In addition to expanding the meaning and
scope of those rights and freedoms, the final Constitution added the right of
access to water, health care and social security,36 the right of access to adequate
housing and prohibition against arbitrary evictions and demolition,3' and the right
to internal self-determination. 9 The third area in which the final Constitution
effects changes in relation to rights and freedoms is on implementation and
enforcement In both the interim and final Constitutions, all the rights are
justiciable and the state/government is obligated to take appropriate measures
to progressively realize them. The final Constitution spells out much more
dearly the duty on the part of organs of state to report regularly to the Human
Rights Commission on measures they have taken (and the difficulties they face)
towards realization of a few of the recognized and protected socio-economic
rights: housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the
environment.3 9
Despite the new constitutional dispensations, the debate regarding the
proper place of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights and the methods of
implementation and enforcement of these rights has not been fully settled;
cMil and political rights.
34 SeeS.Am CoNST. §22.
' SeeS.A. GCNST. §9(2) (Affirmative Action), §23 (labor rights), §24 (environment),
§25(4)-48) access to land, land restitution and strengthening security of tenure for
insecure land rights, § 28 basic nutrition, shelter, basic health and social services for
children, § 29-31 culture and education.
SSee id. 25(8),27.
37 See id. § 26.
' See id. § 235. The only diminution of the scope of the socio-economic rights
previously recognized in the interim Constitution is the omission of the "economic
activity" right. See S.AFR. CoNsT. § 26 (Interim Const. 1993).
39 See S. A. CONST. § 184(3).
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academics continue and will continue to debate the issue 40
IV. OPEN AND HIDDEN EXPRESSIONS OF SOQO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS AND THE CHALLENGE OF CROSS-CUTTING RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
In dischargingthe historic and unprecedented mandate of certifying4 ' the
draft constitution, the Constitutional Court considered three main conceptual
and theoretical issues in relation to socio-economic rights: what constitutes
soco-economic rights among the rights and freedoms in the draft Bill of Rights
chapten whether or notthe inclusion of socio-economic rights in a Bill of Rights
impinged onthe constitutional doctrine of separation of powers as it requires that
courts make decisions that have budgetary implications, which traditionally is
considered the domain of either the executive or legislative branches of
govemrnment; and, lastly, the justiciability of socio-economic rights.42
A "Open'Socio-Economic Rights
As for the third and last issue regarding justiciability, this is dealt with in
Part 4 ofthe essay. On the question of what constitutes socio-economic rights,
the Court was not called upon by the "objectors" to determine the issue in
general. The Court appears to have simply adopted the phraseology used by
the "objectors" with regard to the particular sections, in the then draft
Constitution, that relate to securing the rights of access to housing, health care,
sufficient food and water, social security and basic education.43 In ruling that
irrespective of whether or notthese are universally recognized rights, they were
properly included in the South African Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Court
formally and open/yrecognised these as socio-economic rights. In the present
'0 See ERICA DE WET, THE CoNTrrrUIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS: THE MEANING OF THE GERMAN CoNSTurrToNAL MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA
introduction, chs. 3, 4 (1996); seegenela/Pierre de Vos, Pious Wshes or Directd
Enforceable Human Rights? Social and Economic R'ghts in South Afnca's 1996
Constitu"on, 13 S.AFm J. HUM. RTs. 67 (1997).
" See Certification Judgment, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253, 1264 1 (CC) (the court makes
an observation that "Judicial 'certification' of a constitution is unprecedented and the very
nature of the undertaking is to be explained.').
42 See id. at 76-78.
43 See id. at 76.
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writer's view, the Court did not intend, by categorizing these as socio-economic
rights, to exclude other rights that are recognized in the Constitution,
international instruments and writings of leading jurists, as also falling within the
category of socio-economic rights.4  An example of this would be the
environmental rights provision in the Constitution.45 These rights identified by
the Court and others are commonly regarded as belonging to the socio-
economic rights category that we consider in this essay to be "open" socio-
economic rights. Although the final Constitution does not have the "economic
activity" right present in the Interim Constitution, the jurisprudence developed
under the latter is also relevant to "open" socio-economic rights."
B. Socio-Economic Pghts and he Open orHidden Snania//Budgetay
Implications
Some legal and human rights theorists suggest that afford ability ought
to be a criteria for determining whether or not certain rights should qualify to be
recognized in binding international instruments and national Bill of Rights. A
separate but related theory argues that in recognizing and entrenching rights
which, by their assumed nature may require courts to make decisions with
implication to the budgetary processes of government, the judidal role of courts
is being politicized, thus interfering with the doctrine of separation of powers. In
its Certification Judgment, the Constitutional Court rejected this latter theory,
44 As already noted, the right to work, which is not recognized in the South African Bill
of Rigl-s, is recognized in the Uniersal Declaration of Human Rights. See UDHR, supra
note 23, art. 23(l).
41 See S. Am CONST. § 24. A more restrictive environmental rights provision was
provided for in the interim Constitution. SeeS.Am CONsT. § 29 (Interim Const. 1993).
As has been observed the environmental right is grouped together with those stated in
the Cafication judgement as requiring additional enforcement mechanism. Seesupra
note 39 and accompanyingte. Several cases have given interpretation and defined the
scope of application of the environmental rights provision in the interim Constitution.
See Van Huyssteen v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 1996 (I) SA283
(C); Wildlife Society of Southern Africa v. Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
of the Republic of South Aica, 1996 (3) SA 1095 ("kS); Minister of Health and Welfare
v. Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd., 1996 (3) SA 155 (N).
46 See S v Lawrence, 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC); Ynuico Ltd. v Minister of Trade and
Industry, 1995 (11) IBCLR 1453 (T); Ynuico Ltd. v. Minister of Trade and Industry, 1996
(3) SA 989 (CC); South African Tea, Coffee and Chicory Association v. Ynuico Ltd, 1997
(8) BCLR I 101 (N).
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and by implication the former
The second objection was that the indusion of these rights in
the NT is inconsistent with the separation of powers required
by the CP VI because the judiciary would have to encroach
upon the proper terrain of the legislature and executive. In
particular the objectors argued it would result in the courts
dictating to the govemrnment how the budget should be
allocated. It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights
may result in courts making orders which have direct
implications for budgetary matters. However, even when a
court enforces civil and political rights such as equality, freedom
of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order it makes will
often have such implications. A court may require the
provision of legal aid, orthe extension of state beneficiaries of
such benefits. In our view, it cannot be said that by including
socio-economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred
upon the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred
upon them by a bill of rights that it can result in a breach of the
separation of powers.4 7
The significance of the Court's decision for the present discussion is that it
implicitly rejected the theory that categorization or recognition ofjusticiable rights
should be based on the affordability test. Secondly, the decision rejected the
theory that civil and political rights do not have financial and budgetary
implications. Of course, the enforcement of certain rights under certain
conditions may cost more or less than the enforcement of others. At the same
time, the enforcement of some rights may have direct or open
financial/budgetary implications while the enforcement of others may have
indirect and hidden financial/budgetary implications. Cost implicatiohs are not a
valid consideration in categorizing rights as either socio-economic or civil and
political. The present author has argued elsewhere that human rights, unlike
limited civil liberties, imposes additional responsibility on the state to direct
4 See Certification Judgment, (10) BCLR at 1 77.
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resources towards the realization of rights and freedomes.4
C. Hidden Socio-Economic 'ghts and Rights that are Cross-Cutt'ngBetveen
Sodo-Economic Pghts and CM' and Poldical Rights
Both in the *old" interim Constitution and the final Constitution, the Bill
of Rights and some provisions outside the Bills of Rights do incorporate rights and
freedoms that do not fall among those identified in the Certification judgment as
socio-economic or, at best, as cross-cutting between the two analytical
boundaries of 'socio-economic' and 'civil and political'. The following are the
rights areas which are either of hidden socio-economic character or are cross-
cutting between the two analytical categories identified above.
I. Self-Deternination
In international law, self-determination is recognized as belonging to
both economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights49 There is,
thus, economic, social and cultural self-determination, and there is civil and
political self-determination. Another consideration which is not important for the
present discussion is whether self-determination is internal (within the state) or
'external' - calling for separation or national independence (divisive of an existing
state or political sovereignty from colonial or foreign domination). The final
Constitution recognizes the rightto internal self-determination, but not under the
Bill of Rights.s" Even though the interim Constitution did not recognize it, the
interpretation clause allowed international and regional instruments to be used
to introduce the right in the area of education, religion and culture, even though
the underlying but unarticulated reasons were of race and racial discrimination.5'
48 See Shadrack B. 0. Gutto, vs andbl ofights: Limkatons and Ob/'gations
on the State's Pardpaon in Economic and Social Development, in DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RiGHTS AND EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 173, 173-200 (Nico
Steytler ed., 1997).
49 See ICESCR, supra note 26, art. I; see also, ICCPP, supra note 25, art. I.
s5 See S. AF CoNST. §§ 185-186; Commission for the Promotion and Protection of
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Unguistic Communities; § 235 Self-determination.
s, See Matukane v. Laerskool Potgietersrus, 1996 (3) SA 223 (T).
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2. Equality Before the Law and Protection Against Unfair Discrimination
The rightto equality before the law and protection against unfair discrimination,
like the right to self-determination, is not usually categorized as a socio-economic
right. Quite often, it is treated as a civil and political right A more careful
examination, especially under the formulations adopted in the interim
Constitutions2 and the final Constitution,"3 would suggest that it is really also a
S2 SeS.AFR. CONST. § 8; Equality (interim Const. 1993):
(I) Evey person shall have the right to equality before the law and to
equal protection of the law.
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or
indirectly, and without derogating from the generality of this
provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular:
race, gender, sex, ethnic and social origin, color, sexual orientation,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language.
(3)...
(a) This section shall not preclude measures
designed to achieve the adequate protection and
advancement of persons or groups or categories
of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination,
in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment
of all rights and freedoms.
(b) Every person or community dispossessed of
rights in land before the commencement of this
Constitution under any law which would have
been inconsistent with subsection (2) had that
subsection been in operation at the time of the
dispossession, shall be entitled to claim restitution
of such rights subject to and in accordance with
section 121, 122 and 123.(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any grounds specified in
subsection (2) shall be presumed to be sufficient proof of unfair
discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary
is established.
See S. AF. CoNST. §9; Equality:
(I) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or
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core sodo-economic right It not only cross-cuts the two traditional categories
of rights and freedoms, it also appears to be a normative construct used in
constitutional rights struggles outside of the Bill of Rights provisionsYs Its use is
sometimes open and sometimes hidden, thus acting as an underlying assumption
or premise.
It is rather early in the development of jurisprudence around equality
and non-discrimination to enable definitive conclusions to be drawn with regard
to the trends and social implications of the use of courts in the new South Africa
to either pursue orto forestall social transformation and reconstruction. Casual
observation at this early stage appears to suggest that the relatively privileged
sections of society are more visible as plaintiffs or defendants, applicants or
respondents, in court cases where equality and non-discrimination issues are
involved. The privileged are using equality and non-discrimination provisions to
defend the social status quo. The struggle over rates and service charges by local
authorities"5 as well as employment and promotion in the public services6 are
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be
taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth.
s See Fedsure Life Assurance Limited v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council, 1997 (5) BCLR 657 (W) (displaying the normative construction used by the
litigants concerning local authorities rates and service charges and discussing § 8 of the
interim Constitution 1993). More or less similar social groupings are behind the on-going
constitutional battles over budgetary allocaMions by the new local governments. See
Eastern Metropolitan Substance of the GreaterJohannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council v. Democratic Party, 1997 (8) BCLR 1039 (W) (appealto the Supreme Court
of Appeal which has referred it to the Constitutional Court).
s See, e.g., Municipality ofthe City of Port Elizabeth v. Prut NO, 1997 (6) BCLR 828
(SE) (holding byJ. Uebenberg that writing off of arrears in respect of formerly black areas
and not doing the same in respect of formerly white areas did not constitute unfair
discrimination under §8(2) of the interim Constitution); see also City Council of Pretoria
v. Waler, 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC); Benkes v. Krugersdorp Transitional Local Council,
1996 (3) SA467 (T).
s' See Public Serants'Association of South Africa v. Minister ofJustice, 1997 (3) SA 925
(T). J. Swart ruled that the Minister has acted without proper consultation and, more
importantly, that the targets and quotas suggested by the Minister was unfairly
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cases in point.
For purposes of the present discussion, what is of central relevance is
that the equality and non-discrimination is used to defend or gain economic and
social interests for individuals and groups of people. In this instance, to defend
employment arrangements that have direct economic and social advantages to
the individuals and groups concerned, or to change such arrangements and
thereby effect racial and gender diversity among those employed in the public
service who would then benefit socially and economically. Secure employment
with high levels of earnings contributes not only to well being, it is economically
and socially empowering.
3. Labor Rigt
Under international law and the South Afiican Bill of Rights, "labor rights"
is composite 7 and incorporates rights of association and organization, rights to
equal work, rightto a healthy working environment, right to a paid maternity and
annual leave, right to strike and other forms of "industrial action," freedom from
discrimination, etc. It is therefore a clear case of a straddling or a cross-cutting
right which is both of a socio-economic and a civil and political in nature.
Both the Constitutional Court and the Labor Appeal Court have
considered issues of strike and lockout and took judicial notice of the inequality
of economic power relations between employers and employees," and the
implications of strike action to the economic arrangements and policies in the
discriminatory of mainly Afrikaner men and the few Afrikaner women lawyers in public
service. But cf Mlambo Aj in Public Servants' Association v. Minister of Correctional
Services, Labour Court, case no.J 174)97 (unreported). The proposed arrangements for
transforming the employment profile in the public service was similar to that in the
previous case.
-7 See S.AF% Cow-r. § 27; S.AaR CONST. § 23 (Interim Const. 1993); Convention for
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, adopted July 9, 1948
(entered into forceJuly 4, 1950), 31 ILO C87; Convention for Equal Remuneration,
adopted June 29, 1951 (enteredinto force May 23, 1953), 34 ILO CI00; Convention
for Hofldays with Pay, adopted June 24, 1970 (entered into force June 30, 1973), 54 ILO
C132; Convention for Occupational Safety and Health, adopted June 22, 1981 (entered
into forceAug. I.I, 1983), 67 ILO C155.
s See Certification Judgement, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253, 63-69.
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society and to the litigants in particular.59 Not conceptualizing labour rights as
constituting an important part of socio-economic rights, without diminishing the
importance of its aspects that constitute civil and political rights, is a reflection of
the poverty of the prevailing legal theory. Discussions around justiciability of
socio-economic rights do not get far in such a context.
4. Property Rights and Land Reform
Although property rights and land reform are not universally recognized
both under intemational instruments or national Bills of Rights,' ° the interim
Constitution provided for it, and the final Constitution provides for it.6' Property
in wealth and resources forms the economic and social foundations of any
society, whether property rights are recognized as fundamental human rights or
not.
There seems to be little justification, if any, why property rights and land
reform rights, as expressed in the South African constitutional framework, should
not be considered to belong to the category ofsocio-economic rights. Uke labor
rights, property rights and land reform rights attract and will continue to attract
heavy litigation. The justiciability issue only arises at the level of assessing the
strategies and impact rather than the appropriateness of justiciability.
5. Lezl Aid
Access to justice, linked to the rights of access to courts and equality
before the law, depends to a large degree on the economic strength of
individuals and groups in society. This is true for access to "courts," either
broadly or narrowly defined, in criminal and civil matters where substantial
injustice may result.62 Fair trial, due process and similar other constitutional and
s See Business South Africa v The Congress of South African Trade Unions 1997(6)
BCLR 681 (LAC) (Nicholson, JA dissenting) and (5) BCLR 511 (LAC) (Myburg, J.P.,
Froneman, DJ.P.)
"o See Cerification Judgement, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253, at 71-72 (CC).
61 See S. AfR. CONST. §§ 25,28; Themnis Roux, Property, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARYAND CASE 237-55 (D. Davis et a. eds., 1997); see
gewafMatthew Chaskakon & C Lewis, Property, in CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA (Matthew Chaskalson et al. eds., 1997).
' See Legal Aid Board v. Msila, 1997 (2) BCLR 229, (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 57, at
*9 (Kroon, J.); See also S v. Vermaas, 1995 (3) SA 292 (CC) (Didcott, J., concurring).
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democracy principles and norms presuppose access to "courts," broadly defined.
The Constitution specifically bestows the right to a legal practitioner for
detained, imprisoned and accused persons where substantial injustice would
otherwise occur. Is the provision of legal assistance, at public expense, in order
to secure fair trial or to prevent the occurrence of substantial injustice in the
courts an expression of a civil and political right and/or economic and social right?
It seers thatthe rightto legal aid contains a component which is socio-
economic in nature and the other component which is for the pursuit of a civil
and political right. It is a cross-cutting or straddling right. The recent National
Legal Aid Forurm was partly pre-occupied with the challenge of howthe present
budgetary allocation of three hundred and ffty million rand ( R 350,000,000)
could be used more strategically and effectively in meeting the state's
constitutional obligations to provide legal assistance in the interest of justice.
V. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTSAND ITS LMIS
That the concept of socio-economic rights needs broadening and
deepening should now be sufficiently dear. The "open" traditional socio-
economic rights and the "hidden" and/or "cross-cutting" rights identified in this
essay form an important part of the human rights recognized in the South African
Bill of Rights and international instruments. From an international human rights
point of view, the next important question to be addressed here is how effective
the judicial remedies have been in contributing to the overall real, as opposed to
theoretical, realization of these rightsr
The incorporation of justiciable rights in the Bill of Rights in the context
of a constitutional democracy that respects the Rule of Law and under conditions
of social inequalities as prevails in South Africa necessarily means that such rights
and processes of their justiciability is open to all; rich and poor, the advantaged
and the disadvantaged. The rich and advantaged are entitled to use the rights to
6 See S.Am CoNST. § 35(2c-3g).
6 Convened bythe M nistry and Department of Justice and organized by the Centre for
Applied Legal Studies, Wits University, Jan. 15-17, 1997 at the World Trade Centre,
Kempton Park, Johannesburg.
s In creating the right to effective remedy for human rights, artide 8 states that
"Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for
acts violating the iindamental rights granted him bythe Constitution or by law". UDHR,
supra note 23, at art. 8.
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defend their position while the poor and disadvantaged are entitled to do so in
pursuit of their interests to either be given entry into the camp of the rich and
advantaged or to gain some improvement in their life conditions. The social
actions of all social classes, and social strata in society in using rights tend to
balance out. Thus, there is an overall limitto what individuals, groups and classes
with contending interests, can achieve through the justidability of rights," without
necessarily devaluing the critical importance of justiciability. Justiciability on
economic and social rights is not only about what directly translates into goods
and services, it includes impacting on the development of transformative
normative ideas, values and institutional arrangements.
Given the international and comparative law friendly nature of the South
African Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, the example of judicial activism
to promote sodal justice by the Indian Supreme Court, among others, has been
looked upon as a possible role model.67 Important reforms have been achieved
in India as a result ofjudicial remedies arising from litigation. These and others
could be followed as positive examples, bearing in mind that structural social
inequalities and low levels of realization of socio-economic rights still exists in
India. itigation and judicial activism, however progressive, can only play a limited
contributory role to social transformation.
The recent ruling by the Constitutional Court in the difficult case
involving the right to access to health care has underscored the fact that the
judiciary is very much aware of the limits to remedies it can gie when certain
rights are denied or violated. In the case in point, Arthur Chaskalson, the
President of the Constitutional Court observed:
one cannot but have sympathy for the appellant and his family,
who face the cruel dilemma of having to impoverish
themselves in order to secure the treatment . . .
[Soobramoney] seeks in order to prolong his life. The hard
and unpalatable fact is that if the appellant were a wealthy man
One of my former students, now a prominent human rights scholar and academic in
the USA who was in the UN human rights team to South Africa, recently pointed this
out. See Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Depadr for a New South Africa.- The Limits of
ights Discourse, 10 HAfv. HUm. RTS.J. 63 (1997).
' See Dennis Davis, Matthew Chaskalson and Johan de Waal, Demoacy and
Consb tionaIism: The Role of Consthtonal Interpretaion, in RIGHTS AND
CONTnUDONAUSm: THE NEw SOUTH AFRiCAN LEGAL ORDER, 1, 45-52 (D. Van Wyk et
al. eds., 1994).
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he would be able to procure such treatment from private
sources; he is not and has to look to the State to provide him
with the treatment. But the State's resources are limited...6
Mr. Soobramoney died shortly after the Court's ruling that the right to
access to health care services does not mean the right to access to expensive
specialist health care services which the government cannot afford.
The Constitutional Court has also observed that legal aid does not
attract the best legal services,69 and also that the State should try to boost
allocations to legal aid even though the courts recognized that the resources are
limited and what may be allocated may not be sufficient 7° Its clear explanation
that the power of organized labor, or workers in general, is unequal to that of
the power of employers, or owners of capital is instructive. Furthermore, the
Constitutional Court has judicially determined that the right to strike action by
workers does not alter that social structural reality.7 This clearly demonstrates
the limits to rights discourse in the labour/industrial relations field.
The Constitutional Court has settled the issue as to whether socio-
economic rights are justiciable:
The objectors argued further that socio-economic rights are
not justiciable, in particular because of the budgetary issues
their enforcement may raise.... Nevertheless, we are of the
view that these rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable.
As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of the civil
and political rights entrenched in the NT will give rise to similar
budgetary implications without compromising their justiciability.
The fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give
rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC)
3 1. Contrast this Constitutional Court's ruling to the decision of the Cape Provincial
Division of the High Court in the case involving the issue of medical care for prisoners
suffering from HIV/AIDS. In B. v. Minter of Correctonal Serdces, the court decided
that whereas budgetary considerations are relevant, prisoners are constitutionally entitled
to higher levels of medical care than ordinary citizens. 1997(6) BCLR 787, 49-53.
" SeeS v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665, 49-50, n.79 (CC).
S "eeS vVermaas, Svde Plessis, 1995 (7) BCLR851 (CC), 161-300.
7, See In Re Certification ofthe Constitution ofthe Republic of South Africa, 1996 (10)
BCLR 1253, 66 (CC).
1998 BEYOND JUSTICIABILITY
their justiciability.'
Otherjudicial decisions on socio-economic issues have also rooted the
justicability of socio-economic rights. The constitutional construction in South
Africa is dearthat socio-economic rights are as justiciable as any other rights and
freedoms. The real challenge is how to make justiciability really contribute to
social deconstruction and reconstruction.
Vi. BEYONDJUsTICIlUTYWiTH REGARD TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS:
CHALLENGES TO PUBUC INTERESTAND HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
If we were to be permitted to use the language of industrialists, both
those who provide its labor and capital components, we could say that the South
African constitutional democracy is moving from the stage of design to that of
development, production and distribution. The design of socio-economic rights
and their justiciability, though not perfect or conclusive, has been achieved under
the new rule of law and human rights dispensation. To go beyond this initial
foundational phase, the public interest legal and human rights institutions,
especially academic and activists ones like the Centre for Applied Legal Studies,
are challenged to extend the limits of justiciability through the broadening and
deepening ofthe theoretical perspectives of legal role players who contribute to
the overall implementation/enforcement of the rights. But, there is also the
challenge of institutional capacity building within the public domain, in strategic
organs of state and in the community and civil society.
Lawyers and other professional paralegals engaged in justiciability roles
need to improve their knowledge of rights and strategies when implementing
them. This is not only a constitutional imperative,73 it is also a need necessitated
by the challenging demands of interpretation that is informed by broader
understanding of intemational and comparative law, which appears to require
expert academic interventions.74 To have a greater impact, such an enterprise
may require strategic interventions at all levels, not only at the High Court, Court
SId. at 78.
7 See S. Am CONST. § 180(a)(roviding for training programmes for judicial officers).
7 The critiques of the judgement in the AZAPO case, AZAPO v President of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 562 (CC), is suggestive. SeeJohn Dugard, Is the
Tth andReconciton Process Compatabile wt International Law? An Unaxmvred
Queston, 13 S.AFmJ. HUm. RTs. 258 (1997).
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of Appeal and Constitutional Court levels. Of course, the courts depend on
good lawyering by litigating lawyers. Effective contributions to constitutional,
human rights and commercial law legal training and continuing legal education,
especially to those formerly disadvantaged, is critical.
The promotion and implementation of socio-economic rights, in the
South African context, requires development of sharpened normative guidelines
that favour redistributive social justice at production and consumption levels. A
different kind of critical legal studies is called for in this field.
The Constitution envisages the implementation and enforcement of
sodo-econornic rights via the agency of "courts," broadly and generally defined.
Hence, the contributions to institutional development and functioning in bodies
such as the Human Rights Commission, Commission on Gender Equality and
the CCMA with which the Centre for Applied Legal Studies is already involved,
should be strengthened. In addition, strategic training of lawyers in the public
service and intervention in institutions like the Legal Aid Board can make a
difference to the strengthening of human rights and rule of law. Given the role
that institutions, such as the police, play in the maintenance and enforcement of
law, eforts to infuse such institutions with relevant human rights education and
to monitor their functioning appear to be necessary and relevant.
Overall, legal and human rights academic institutions and individuals
need to reposition themselves and to contribute meaningfully and relevantly to
the building of strong foundations for constitutionalism, democracy and human
rights for the present and future South Africa. There seems to be a need for
partisanism in our approach to human rights by engaging lawyering roles with the
commitment either to strengthening the status quo, with its glaring inequalities
and class-based injustices, or to contribute to uplifting the status of the
disadvantaged and marginalized which may imply making demands on the
historically privileged sections of the society.
7S See S.AK CONST. § 205(3) (providing that "[t]he objects of the police service are to
prevent, combat and investigate crime,...to protect and secure the inhabitants of the
Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.").
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